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Abstract
Background: Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) penetrated the Turkish cigarette market due to trade and
investment liberalization in the post-1980 period and eventually secured full control. Despite tobacco control policies put
in place in reaction to accelerating consumption, TTCs reinforced their market power through a variety of strategies. This
paper explores industry strategies that counteract tobacco control policies in Turkey.
Methods: The study employs both qualitative and quantitative analyses to explore industry strategies in Turkey. Besides
the content analyses of industry and market reports, descriptive analyses were conducted for the sub-periods of 1999–
2015. The analyses focus on the market strategies of product innovation, advertisement-promotion, cost management
and pricing.
Results: Rising sales of low tar, ultra-low tar, slim, super-slim and flavoured cigarettes indicate that product innovation
served to sustain consumption. Besides, the tobacco industry, using its strong distribution channels, the Internet, and
CSR projects, were found to have promoted smoking indirectly. The industry also rationalized manufacturing facilities
and reduced the cost of tobacco, making Turkey a cigarette-manufacturing base. Tobacco manufacturers, moreover,
offered cigarettes in different price segments and adjusted net prices both up and down according to price categories
and market conditions. In response to the successful effect of shifts in price margins, the market share of mid-priced
cigarettes expanded while those within the economy category maintained the highest market share. As a result of
pricing strategies, net sales revenues increased. Aside from official cigarette sales, the upward trends in the registered
and unregistered sales of cigarette substitutes indicate that the demand-side tobacco control efforts remain inadequate.
Conclusions: The Turkish case reveals that the resilience of the tobacco industry vis-à-vis mainstream tobacco control
efforts necessitates a new policy perspective. Rising market concentration by TTCs and the global nature of industry
strategies require that the highly profitable manufacturing and trade of tobacco products should be discouraged on a
basis of international collaboration. To reduce and eventually eradicate tobacco consumption, supply-side tobacco
control measures are needed along with demand-side policies.
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Background
Liberalization of the tobacco trade and investment under
the auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank (WB) and World Trade Organization
(WTO) [1] has made the tobacco epidemic a global
phenomenon. As transnational tobacco companies
(TTCs) rushed into low- and middle-income countries
in the 1980s and 1990s, they acquired privatized public
monopolies [2]; followed aggressive marketing strategies;
used efficient distribution networks; and extensively in-
creased the number of retail sales points [3]. In response
to the rise in tobacco consumption1 [1, 4] and tobacco-
related deaths [5], the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) [6] was endorsed in 2003
under the auspices of the World Health Organization
(WHO). The FCTC and the following policy package
“MPOWER”2 in 2008 [7] intend to modify the behaviour
of (potential) smokers through measures such as sales
taxes and advertising bans. On the other hand, smug-
gling controls, banning sales to minors and alternative
crop policies remain to be a few supply-side measures
* Correspondence: dkaraka@itu.edu.tr
2Department of Management Engineering, Faculty of Management, Istanbul
Technical University, 34367, Macka, Istanbul, Turkey
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Keklik and Gultekin-Karakas BMC Public Health  (2018) 18:282 
DOI 10.1186/s12889-018-5071-z
mandated by the FCTC that target the manufacturing
and trade of tobacco [4]. Meanwhile, to maintain its ex-
istence, the tobacco industry continued to use market
strategies of product innovation3; advertising4; foreign
investment5; pricing,6 and illicit trade7 as well as non-
market strategies of lobbying8 and deceptive and/or
manipulative activity in scientific research.9 The con-
tinuing growth of TTCs [8] has triggered a debate on
the effectiveness of demand-side policies and the need
for a greater emphasis on supply-side measures in the
FCTC.10
The penetration of TTCs via exportation and then dir-
ect investment in the post-1980 period comprehensively
restructured the Turkish tobacco sector [9]. By 2015, five
transnational companies −PhilSA, Japan Tobacco Inter-
national (JTI), BAT, Imperial and European− had
acquired 99.5% of the previously state-controlled Turkish
cigarette market [10]. Concomitantly, cigarette consump-
tion increased dramatically (Additional file 1), necessitat-
ing the adoption of tobacco control measures. The first
tobacco control law (No. 4207) was passed in 1996.
Despite the lack of a clear penalty clause, the law was suc-
cessful in terms of restricting smoking in specific places
and securing advertising bans and written warnings on
packages [11]. However, the ban on sales to minors under
the age of 18 was not successfully implemented due to in-
sufficient inspections [12]. Turkey signed the FCTC in
2004, and, having abided by its requirements, a new law
(No. 5727) broadening the scope of the previous law was
passed in 2008 [12]. This gradually brought a 100%
smoke-free regulation to all closed and common places in-
cluding catering businesses and cabs; it also extended the
advertising bans to include tobacco sponsorships. With
this step, Turkey became one of the first six countries in
the world (UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Uruguay, Bermuda,
and Turkey) to have a powerful anti-tobacco law [13]. To-
bacco excise taxes were also substantially increased after
2010. These tobacco control policies, however, have had a
very limited effect on cigarette consumption which re-
mains far above the level of the early1980s before the to-
bacco market was opened to TTCs.11
It is critical to discuss the Turkish case for several rea-
sons: Turkey’s tobacco market saw a dramatic restruc-
turing with the entry of TTCs: the state monopoly and
farming subsidies were abolished; tobacco production
decreased while import increased, and consumption ac-
celerated [14]. In the process, Turkey’s anti-tobacco
strategies have been rated a success by government
authorities [13] and WHO [15]. Despite tobacco control
interventions, manufacturing and the trade of tobacco
products, however, continue to be a profitable business.
Accordingly, there is a need to address the strategies
that serve to sustain the existence and profitability of the
tobacco industry. On this basis, it will be possible to
design policies that could end this sector as a source of
profit at the expense of public health. The literature on
the Turkish tobacco market is very limited, mostly
adhering to chronological accounts which fail to present
any in-depth empirical findings and analytical research.
To our best knowledge, this is the first article based on a
comprehensive data analysis to address various industry
strategies in the Turkish cigarette market. Besides, the
analysis is enriched with relevant data and information
on the registered and unregistered markets of other
tobacco products. The paper contributes also to the inter-
national literature by addressing a middle-income country
case. The elaboration of tobacco industry strategies in
Turkey would allow comparisons with the cases of other
countries to draw lessons applicable internationally.
Methods
This study examines the market strategies of product
innovation, advertisement-promotion, cost management
and pricing for Turkey by employing both qualitative
and quantitative analyses. Besides the content analyses
of industry and market reports, descriptive analyses were
conducted for different periods within the span of 1999–
2015 as the data available for specific industry strategies
rarely covered the same period. We disregarded non-
market strategies because of the difficulty in addressing
all industry strategies. Further research can include the
fieldwork necessary to fully understand the role of non--
market strategies. The analysis focuses on cigarettes − the
most commonly used tobacco product in Turkey −, while
also shedding light on other tobacco products to evaluate
tobacco control efforts. Because of the limited scope of the
paper, illicit trade was included merely to show that con-
sumption of tobacco products is higher in Turkey than offi-
cial cigarette sales indicate.
Product innovation strategy
We examined the trends in cigarette sales by tar level,
thickness and flavour to shed light on the use of product
innovation strategy to sustain smoking. The data source
was Passport Database of Euromonitor International.
Firstly, we compared the sales of high tar, low tar, ultra
low tar and mid-tar12 cigarettes for the period of 2007–
2015. Then, we evaluated the sales of slim and super-
slim cigarettes in comparison to regular cigarettes
between 2008 and 2015. Thirdly, we explored the
changes in sales of cigarettes with flavour in comparison
to standard cigarettes between 1999 and 2015.
Advertisement-promotion strategy
We evaluated advertising-promotion strategy on the
basis of the review of the academic literature, as well as
company and market reports (Euromonitor). Given the
advertising bans, we focused on the use of the indirect
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channels for the promotion of consumption which are
distribution networks, the Internet and CSR projects.
Cost-management strategy
We firstly reviewed the findings in the academic litera-
ture and company reports (Euromonitor) regarding cost
management strategy. Then, we focused on changes in
the cost of tobacco in the 2000s. Firstly, we calculated
decreases in the cost of imported tobacco between 2010
and 2015. To this end, the following data was retrieved
from Tobacco and Alcohol Market Regulatory Authority
(TAPDK): dollar values of the Tobacco Fund, an excise
tax levied on imported tobacco per ton; and, volumes of
domestic and imported tobacco used by tobacco manu-
facturers. We subtracted the Tobacco Fund in the rele-
vant year from the value of the Fund that was imposed
in 2010. The difference was multiplied by the quantity of
imported tobacco in the relevant year. Afterwards, we
calculated the savings from the costs of tobacco over the
period. Secondly, we aimed to see whether the industry
increasingly provided tobacco from the low-cost regions
in Turkey. Thus, by using the data from TAPDK, we
explored the regional trends in volumes of domestic to-
bacco purchases by the manufacturers for the period
2010–2015.
Pricing strategy
Pricing strategy was analysed for three brand segments:
the economy, mid-priced and premium brands. Because
of data constraints, the analysis was restricted to the
period 2005–2012 and also to the average annual prices
per pack of only seven cigarette brands. The premium
segment consists of Parliament and Marlboro, both pro-
duced by PhilSA; in the mid-priced segment, there is
Winston, produced by JTI; and in the economy segment
there are Monte Carlo, produced by JTI, and Tekel
2001, Maltepe and Samsun all produced by BAT. The
price data was retrieved from Passport Database of
Euromonitor International. To calculate real values, we
used the Consumer Price Index (CPI) (2003 based)
released by Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat). The
brands were categorized according to the price classifi-
cation adopted by Euromonitor International: cigarette
brands with a price of 10 TL and above per pack were
classified as premium; between 8.1–9.99 TL as mid-
priced; and, 8 TL and below as economy [16].
The analysis followed four steps: Firstly, after-tax real
weighted prices13 for pack of 20 cigarettes were calcu-
lated for the three brand segments. Then, to identify the
trends in net prices, before-tax (net) real weighted
prices14 were calculated. Thirdly, we looked at the
performance of different price segments in share of mar-
ket volume. However, because of the limited number of
cigarette brands for which the data was available, the
sample underrepresented the total cigarette sales in the
period under consideration. Indeed, the sample repre-
sented the premium cigarette market well; and the rep-
resentative power of the sample increased for the mid-
priced segment after 2006. The market for economy
brands, however, became underrepresented by the sam-
ple after 2007 (Table 1) since sales volumes of newly in-
troduced economy brands increased (Fig. 1). This
situation would have resulted in misrepresentation as it
may have been thought that sales volumes and net reve-
nues in the economy segment declined over the years. In
fact, the total market data showed that the economy seg-
ment achieved the highest sales volume (almost 54% of
the market in 2012) (Fig. 2). Therefore, the total market
sales data was more reliable than the sample data. Con-
sequently, the changes in before-tax (net) nominal sales
revenues for the three brand segments have been exam-
ined by taking into account total market sales (Add-
itional file 2). To find net revenues, net nominal
weighted prices of the sample brands were multiplied by
the total market sales volumes. In the evaluation of the
changes in total volume of market sales and net nominal
sales revenues, trends in price margins between different
brand segments were taken into accounts.
Results
A limited number of studies present partial findings con-
nected to specific industry strategies in Turkey. The in-
dustry interfered via lobbying in the making of tobacco
control laws in the 1990s [17, 18]. The neo-liberal trans-
formation of the Turkish tobacco market in favour of
TTCs stimulated trade and manufacturing and resulted
in accelerated consumption [9, 14]. While some tobacco
control policies were put into effect, the industry contin-
ued to be supported through tax and investment incen-
tives [19]. Tobacco companies used tax increases to
disguise their before-tax nominal price rises, raising their
sales revenues in the last years [20, 21]. Violations of
bans are pervasive: one out of every four hospitality
premises in four districts of Istanbul was observed to be
violating the smoke-free law in 2015 [22]; also, rising
Table 1 Share of the sample in total cigarette sales (%), 2005–2012
Premium Mid-priced Economy
2005 80.1 24.1 61.9
2006 79.3 24.5 62.3
2007 80.3 37.8 64.0
2008 68.0 60.9 42.5
2009 75.1 66.6 42.8
2010 78.5 66.9 32.5
2011 78.9 66.9 31.3
2012 79.9 66.7 28.5
Data source: [10]
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violations of display rules at points of sale show that the
industry uses points of sale as avenues for advertising
and promotion targeting the youth and other groups
[23]. The comprehensive findings of this research on the
Turkish case further support the claim that TTCs con-
tinue to manufacture as long as they make a profit, sell-
ing more products and in more varieties [4, 24].
Tobacco control policies, therefore, will remain inad-
equate as long as they fail to target the industry as the
supplier of tobacco products [25].
Product innovation strategy
TTCs perpetuated smoking firstly by lowering tar
levels. Consumers began to prefer reduced tar ciga-
rettes since they perceived them to be less harmful
than high-tar cigarettes: The sales of high-tar ciga-
rettes ended by 2010; during the period 2007–2015,
sales of mid-tar cigarettes increased by only 2.9%
while the rate reached 66.3% for low-tar cigarettes
and 204% for ultra-low tar cigarettes (Fig. 3).
Secondly, TTCs released slim and super-slim cigarettes
that are longer and contain less tobacco. The sales of
regular cigarettes decreased by 6.2% while the sales of
slim and super-slim cigarettes increased by 132.1% and
236% respectively during the period 2008–2015 (Fig. 4).
Thirdly, cigarettes were made more attractive by add-
ing flavour. As the sales of standard cigarettes had a ten-
dency to decrease in the period 1999–2007, sales of
cigarettes with flavour (menthol (non capsule) and fla-
vour capsule (all flavours)) fluctuated until 2007 and
then increased by 218% between 2007 and 2015 (Fig. 5).
As a result, rapid product differentiation makes Turkey
a special case. While the market for tobacco products
had included only a few brands during the state-
monopoly period, there were 589 domestically produced
and licensed products as of April 2014 [26]. Further-
more, due to insufficient regulation, cigarette
Fig. 1 Cigarette sales for the sample and for the total market* by price segment (in billion packs), 2005–2012. Data source: [10]
Fig. 2 Cigarette market shares by price segment (%), 2005–2012. Data source: [10]
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manufacturers could use more than 600 additives and
consequently designed more attractive and addictive
products [26].
Advertising, promotion and sponsorship strategies
Although FCTC Article 13 [6] forbids all direct and in-
direct advertising, promotion and sponsorship activities,
the Turkish tobacco industry violates this rule. The retail
ban on minors under the age of 18 is commonly violated
[27] at points of sale. There are about 158 thousand
points of sale registered by the TAPDK. Tobacco manu-
facturers use their own distribution channels to deliver
cigarettes to points of sale which include groceries,
markets, supermarkets, hypermarkets, kiosks, sellers of
dried nuts and specialty outlets that sell only tobacco
and alcoholic beverages [9]. The distribution channels
play an important part in the operation of the tobacco
industry: PhilSA reaches 143 thousand points of sale
with 828 employees out of 1613 [28]; JTI reaches 150
thousand points of sale with 132 employees out of 600
[29]; and BAT distributes to 125 thousand points of sale
[30]. Employees who work in the sales, marketing and
distribution departments of the TTCs in question carry
out regular visits to pre-established points of sale,
renewing display racks although advertising of tobacco
products is forbidden in Turkey [31]. Points of sale are
often grouped into four or five segments according to
the income level and social status of the neighbour-
hoods; and, while renewing display racks, different
branding and marketing strategies are employed in those
segments to increase sales [31].
A recent survey in seven city centres shows that nearly
91.4% of retailers were engaged in at least one type of
violation of the display ban [23]. Tobacco product
Fig. 3 Cigarette sales in Turkey by tar level (billion sticks), 2007–2015. Data source: [10]
Fig. 4 Cigarette sales in Turkey by thickness (billion sticks), 2008–2015. Data source: [10]
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displays at points of sale could not be prevented because
of insufficient inspection mechanisms to monitor the
wide distribution channels of TTCs [23]. Besides, brand
promotion and advertisements were made via the inter-
net and electronic mail; new advertising strategies were
developed on social media; and an image of reputable
and legitimate corporations was created via CSR projects
against prohibitions for direct advertising [9]. For
instance, in 2011 PMI allocated 25.3% of its worldwide
CSR spending to projects in Turkey [32]. Smoke-free
violations in indoor places are also high [9]. The indus-
try tried to build cooperation with the representatives of
cafes, hotels and restaurants in order to reverse the in-
door smoking ban in 2008 [33].
Cost management strategy
While TTCs preferred to shut down manufacturing
plants in certain countries [34], they selected Turkey as
a manufacturing base and rationalized their plants for ef-
ficiency. After the purchase of the state monopoly
TEKEL in 2008, BAT rationalized the widespread manu-
facturing network of TEKEL: it closed down most of
TEKEL’s plants; and around 12 thousand workers were
fired. BAT had located cigarette factories in both Izmir
and Samsun, then closed down the Izmir factory (estab-
lished in 2002) and moved the means of production to
the Samsun facility [30]. Likewise, PMI and JTI estab-
lished high capacity manufacturing plants equipped with
the latest technology. The leading manufacturer PhilSA
has a factory in Izmir that is the fourth biggest PMI fac-
tory in the world with the capacity to manufacture 40
billion sticks per year [28]. Moreover, JTI‘s single factory
(established in 1993 in Izmir) can produce 8 to 10 thou-
sand cigarettes per minute, and its annual production is
around 35 billion sticks [29]. Also, without any
curtailment, the tobacco industry in Turkey can benefit
from state subsidies for the production, export and im-
port of tobacco products, helping to reduce costs [19].
TTCs were also able to reduce the cost of tobacco.
What facilitated this was firstly the Tobacco Law (No.
4733) passed in 2002 upon the commitment to the
IMF. By Law, the state’s subsidized purchases of
tobacco had ended and contracted farming started,
leaving tobacco farmers without any pricing power to
produce and sell at the request of TTCs. The aboli-
tion of subsidies and the low pricing policy has
driven tobacco farmers into poverty, resulting in a
substantial contraction in cultivation [9]. From 1989
to 2015, the population of tobacco farmers and
volume of production contracted by 89% and 72% re-
spectively, making Turkey a net importer of tobacco
since 2012 [35, 36]. Secondly, a legal amendment to
the Tobacco Fund helped the industry to reduce
costs. The Fund was levied to improve tobacco culti-
vation and support farmers in 1986 [37]. In 2008
Turkey made a commitment to eliminate the Fund
between 2010 and 2018 as the European Union (EU)
argued that it discriminated against imports [9]. The
abolition of the Fund allowed TTCs to import Ameri-
can tobacco more cheaply, contributing to industry
profitability.
The Fund was reduced from 3000$/tons in 2010,
2250$/tons in 2011, 1800$/tons in 2012, 1500$/tons in
2013, 1200$/tons in 2014, and to 900$/tons in 2015 [38].
As a result, the use of imported tobacco exempted from
the Tobacco Fund increased by 61.2% and those
purchased with a lowered fund increased by 22.8% in
cigarette manufacturing [36].15 As TTCs increasingly
used imported tobacco, the cost of tobacco decreased
significantly during the period 2010–2015 (Table 2). In
Fig. 5 Flavoured and standard cigarette sales in Turkey (billion sticks), 1999–2015. Data source: [10]
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2015, the total savings achieved due to the removal or
reduction of the Tobacco Fund reached $226,926,300
(=101,025,000 + 125,901,300).
Aside from cost saving through the Tobacco Fund,
TTCs were also able to reduce cost by purchasing to-
bacco at the lowest price. In that sense, the purchases of
tobacco from the low-cost Mediterranean, Eastern
Anatolia and South-eastern Anatolia Regions increased
compared to the lower share of Aegean, Black Sea and
Marmara Regions in total domestic tobacco use (Fig. 6).
Industry pricing strategy
The analysis shows the trends in cigarette prices, vol-
umes and revenues by brand segment in Turkey between
2005 and 2012. The after-tax real prices went up in all
price segments except in 2008 and 2011 when the global
financial and Euro debt crises adversely influenced
Turkey (Fig. 7).
Figure 8 depicts before-tax (net) real weighted prices.
During 2005–2009 when the minimum specific SCT per
pack changed only marginally (Table 3), net real prices
tended to rise in all categories, supporting profitability
(except for the year 2007 for premium brands and for
the crisis year 2008) (Table 4). In 2010 when SCT per
pack (% of retail price) increased, the tobacco industry
passed on taxes to consumers by increasing net real
prices in all price segments. Yet in 2011 when SCT per
pack (% of retail price) continued to increase, TTCs low-
ered net real prices to reduce the amount of tax that
consumers had to pay. This increased sales volumes of
the mid-priced and premium brands (Fig. 1), limiting
the decrease in total sales revenues (Fig. 9). However, in
2012 when taxes remained constant, tobacco manufac-
turers increased net real prices in all segments (Fig. 8)
and due to the higher sales of mid-priced and premium
brands, their revenues improved (Fig. 9). As a result,
Table 2 Cost savings in cigarette manufacturing due to the removal/reduction of the Tobacco Fund, 2010–2015
Imported Tobacco with removed Tobacco Fund Imported Tobacco with reduced Tobacco Fund
Quantity used (tons) Decrease in the cost of imported
tobacco for cigarette manufacturers
($) (compared to 2010)
Quantity used (tons) Decrease in the cost of imported tobacco
for cigarette manufacturers ($) (compared
to 2010)
2010 20,895 62,685,117 – –
2011 22,536 67,606,706 44,664 33,497,973
2012 29,002 87,006,545 53,981 64,776,785
2013 28,779 86,338,262 52,919 79,378,626
2014 31,573 94,718,086 56,834 102,301,076
2015 33,675 101,025,000 59,953 125,901,300
Data source: [92]
Fig. 6 Tobacco purchases by tobacco manufacturers by regions in Turkey, 2010–2015. Data source: [36]
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according to market conditions, TTCs adjusted their
prices by brand segments to maintain their revenues.
While TTCs were adjusting prices to offset rises in
tax, the tobacco industry gathered the highest net nom-
inal sales revenue in the economy segment during
2007–2012 (Fig. 9). This is because economy brands had
the highest market share (Fig. 2) despite their unit rev-
enue being low. Even though they had a similar market
share to mid-priced brands (Fig. 2), premium brands
accrued more revenues (Fig. 9) due to higher per unit
revenue. Furthermore, sales revenues from the mid-
priced segment increased after 2008 (Fig. 9) accompany-
ing the rise in its market share (Fig. 2). This outcome
was related to the changes in price margins. The price
margins between the premium and economy brands as
well as between the mid-priced and economy brands
tended to decrease especially after 2007 (Fig. 10). Along
with the declining price margins, consumers tended to
shift to mid-priced brands, leading to the rising market
share in this segment (Fig. 2). Meanwhile, the market
share of the economy brands decreased after 2009 while
the fall in the share of premium brands stopped in 2011
(Fig. 2). Lastly, in spite of the adoption of tobacco con-
trol policies, the trend of increasing total sales revenues
was noteworthy (Fig. 9).
Even though our analysis had to be restricted to the
period of 2005–2012, some points about pricing strategy
pursued after 2012 can be emphasized. Firstly, tobacco
manufacturers took advantage of the existing tax struc-
ture in Turkey. In the process of harmonization with EU
regulations, a specific tax was added per cigarette pack
as of 1 January 2013 and this tax increased over the
years (Table 5). However, ad valorem taxes (SCT and
VAT) account for more than 80% of the 10 TL retail
price of a packet of cigarettes while specific tax accounts
for a very small ratio of only 2% of the total tax burden.
Fig. 7 After-tax real weighted prices per pack of cigarettes by price segment, 2005–2012. Data source: [10 93]
Fig. 8 Before-tax (net) real weighted prices per pack of cigarettes by price segment, (TL) 2005–2012
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Bakir indicates that the very high ad valorem taxes in
contrast to the EU led tobacco manufacturers in Turkey
to price competition [39]. This increased after mid-2013,
especially for some mid-priced and premium brands. As
a result, consumption was encouraged due to the
lowered tax burden on consumers. Moreover, to avoid
tax increases, price-sensitive consumers tended to shift
to cheaper brands because of their lower ad valorem
taxes. Due to the increases in the specific tax per pack
(Table 5), moreover, low-priced cigarettes became more
expensive and thus demand for the mid-priced brands
was boosted [39].
Consumption of tobacco products in Turkey
Although total registered cigarette sales did at first de-
crease marginally between 2008 and 2012 in response to
tobacco control interventions, as a result of the above-
discussed industry activities, they persistently increased
from 91.6 to 105.5 billion sticks between 2013 and 2016.
SCT revenues from tobacco products meanwhile
consistently increased from 20 to 25 billion Turkish Lira
between 2003 and 2015 and the share of tobacco prod-
ucts in total SCT revenues reached 26% in 2015 [40].
In the discussion of the effectiveness of tobacco con-
trol policies, there is a need to consider the consumption
of contraband products. It is estimated that 10–15% of
cigarette consumption in Turkey was based on illegal
products during the period 2002–2007 [33]. This shows
that actual consumption has been much higher than the
official cigarette sales indicate.16 Moreover, as a result of
increasing sales taxes,17 price-responsive consumers
tend to use tobacco that consists of cut tobacco sold in a
packaged format for use in roll-your-own (RYO)
cigarettes (Fig. 11). RYO tobacco is preferred to ciga-
rettes especially among young smokers as it is cheaper
[41]. Figure 11 only depicts official sales, but industry
experts believe that the total size of the RYO tobacco
market - including illicit sales - was around 14,000 tons
in 2014, although no official data for illicit trade exists
[41]. Therefore, for 2014, total cigarette consumption
increased from 94.7 to around 122.7 billion sticks when
the sales of official and illicit RYO tobacco (1 g = 1
cigarette stick) as well as contraband cigarettes18 are
considered.
Next, there is the need to regard the consumption of
non-cigarette tobacco products that are currently manu-
factured by domestic firms in Turkey. Firstly, waterpipe
smoking (hookah) has accelerated worldwide since the
1990s but most markedly in the Middle East and North
Africa. Waterpipe tobacco (WT) is falsely marketed as
being less harmful than cigarettes. In reality, it makes it
more difficult to quit cigarette smoking and leads young
adolescents to start cigarette consumption [42]. Drawing
on the Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS), it is
claimed that overall waterpipe smoking prevalence de-
clined in Turkey between 2008 and 2012 from 2.3% to
0.8% [43]. However, the prevalence in the 15–24 age
group was much higher (4.3%) and the prevalence did
not decline among females and non-graduates as the
GATS found in 2012 [44]. Waterpipe smoking is spread-
ing especially among the younger population; GATS
shows that the use of cigarettes and other tobacco prod-
ucts among the young in Turkey increased by 51% and
88% respectively between 2003 and 2012 [44]. New stud-
ies raise serious concerns about the rapidly growing hoo-
kah sector in the country: illicit products constitute 99%
of the total WT consumption, revealing that the informal
economy dominates the WT market [42, 45]. It is
estimated that 15,500 waterpipe smoking businesses
were in operation while the number of TAPDK regis-
tered businesses was only 1220 as of October 2016 [42].
Also, while the official annual production volume of WT
was only 9 tons in Turkey, the total annual consumption
Table 3 Sales taxes on cigarettes, 2005–2012
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 January 2010 September 2011 November 2011 May 2012
Minimum specific SCT per stick (TL) 0.0675 0.0700 0.0750 0.0775 0.1025 0.1325 – – –
Minimum specific SCT per pack (TL)
(20 sticks* Minimum specific SCT per stick)
1.35 1.40 1.50 1.55 2.05 2.65 0.00 0.00 –
Specific SCT per pack (TL) – – – – – – – – –
SCT per pack (% of retail price) 58.00% 58.00% 58.00% 58.00% 58.00% 63.00% 69.00% 65.00% 65.00%
VAT per pack (% of retail price) 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0%
Data source: [38]
Table 4 Change in before-tax (net) real weighted prices per
pack of cigarettes by price segment (TL), 2005–2012
Premium Mid-priced Economy
2005–2006 0.043 0.038 0.047
2006–2007 −0.012 0.005 0.004
2007–2008 −0.043 −0.017 −0.003
2008–2009 0.020 0.012 0.047
2009–2010 0.004 0.019 0.035
2010–2011 −0.125 −0.093 −0.072
2011–2012 0.030 0.039 0.043
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was estimated approximately 1500 tons in 2015 [42]. Ris-
ing consumption, therefore, was based on both domestic-
ally produced and imported contraband WT [42, 45]. All
these point to significant inspection and enforcement
failures in the Turkish WT market.
The consumption of cigars and cigarillos has also been
a rising trend in Turkey. As a consequence of the
TAPDK’s lifting of the restriction on the import of cigars
and cigarillos by non-manufacturing companies in 2011,
the import of foreign brands and consumption was
found to have increased dramatically by 2012 (Fig. 12).
In that year TAPDK stipulated that only those cigars
and cigarillos with specific ingredients conforming to
the standards released by the Turkish Standards Institute
could be sold [46]. As a result in 2012 official sales de-
creased while the sales of the products that could not be
imported increased in the contraband cigar and cigarillo
market [47]. As reported by trade experts, around 85%
of the sales of cigars and cigarillos in 2013 were illegal
[47]. Therefore, the decrease in official sales of cigar and
cigarillo after 2011 masks the high magnitude of real
consumption (Fig. 12).
Discussion
Tobacco control policies implemented to confront the
tobacco epidemic directly conflict with tobacco compan-
ies’ raison d’être [25]. The industry always tries to coun-
teract tobacco control policies implicitly [14]. Various
countries’ experiences show that the industry either acts
to prevent the adoption of tobacco control policies, or if
it cannot prevent them, aims to undermine them [34,
48–53]. The literature reveals that in the face of tobacco
control measures, tobacco manufacturers maintain their
existence by pursuing a variety of tactics.
The overall results are compatible with global tobacco
industry strategies addressed in the literature. The
Fig. 9 Before-tax (net) nominal sales revenues (billion TL), 2005–2012
Fig. 10 Price margins between premium and economy brands and between mid-priced and economy brands (TL), 2005–2012. * Calculated with
real weighted prices
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pursuit of multiple strategies is also valid in the Turkish
case, making tobacco control policies largely ineffective.
Government interventions in the form of sales taxes and
advertising bans etc. are nullified by a tobacco industry
that continues to innovate products, finds indirect ways
to advertise, manipulates excise tax increases for higher
sales revenues as well as manages costs in multiple ways.
Turkey should therefore utilize supply-side measures
that directly target the trade and manufacturing activ-
ities of tobacco companies.
The industry in Turkey also perpetuates smoking ad-
diction via product innovation. What distinguishes
Turkey, however, is rapid product innovation. Since
there is no standardization of cigarette packages and
sticks, it creates more room for product innovation [14].
Product innovation and use of additives in tobacco prod-
ucts, therefore, should be banned and plain packaging
needs to be adopted.
The use of indirect tactics for advertising, promotion
and sponsorship in Turkey is also similar to cases in
other countries with restrictive tobacco control mea-
sures, but the bans on sales to minors, product display
and indoor smoking have been widely circumvented in
Turkey. The very high number of points of sale in
Turkey has to be reduced and sales of tobacco products
must be restricted to only specialty outlets. The sales
ban to minors under the age of 18 should come into full
force.
In regard to cost management strategies there are fur-
ther features specific to Turkey: The removal of the To-
bacco Fund on imported tobacco, use of government
investment subsidies and the privatization of the state
monopoly TEKEL have helped TTCs secure greater
profitability. All kinds of subsidies to the tobacco indus-
try should consequently end and negative incentives
should be imposed on the industry such as higher cor-
porate tax rates.
Similar to many other countries, Turkey has a high
market concentration in cigarette manufacturing which
ensures pricing power and profitability for TTCs. Our
detailed analysis of pricing strategy shows that without
before-tax price controls, the industry is able to use tax
and market structures to manipulate consumers, nullify-
ing tax interventions by the authorities. Therefore, to
increase the effectiveness of tax policies, policy makers
need to consider the pricing strategies pursued by to-
bacco manufacturers. The high share of ad valorem
taxes in cigarette prices allows the manufacturers to en-
gage in price competition in the upper price segments,
and thereby undermine tobacco control. Therefore, to
discourage price competition, sales taxes need to be
based mainly on specific taxes rather than ad valorem
Table 5 Sales taxes on cigarettes, 2012–2016
January 2013 July 2013 January 2014 July 2014 January 2015 July 2015 January 2016
Minimum specific SCT per stick (TL) 0.1575 0.1613 0.1875 0.1971 0.1994 0.2103 0.2210
Minimum specific SCT per pack (TL)
(20 sticks* Minimum specific SCT per stick)
3.15 3.23 3.75 3.94 3.99 4.21 4.42
Specific SCT per pack (TL) 0.0900 0.0922 0.1300 0.1366 0.1866 0.1968 0.2468
SCT per pack (% of retail price) 65.25% 65.25% 65.25% 65.25% 65.25% 65.25% 65.25%
VAT per pack (% of retail price) 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0% 18.0%
Data source: [38]
Fig. 11 RYO tobacco sales in Turkey (tons =million sticks), 2011–2015. Data source: [10]
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taxes. Additionally, to compliment sales tax increases,
ceilings on before-tax prices of cigarettes can help to
prevent hidden price increases by manufacturers. Lastly,
consideration should be given to the possibility that
tobacco-trading and manufacturing companies could be
publically operated.
Moreover, accelerating trends in the registered and un-
registered sales of other tobacco products make Turkey
a special case. Aside from official cigarette sales, the up-
ward trend in the registered and unregistered sales of
cigarette substitutes indicate that tobacco control efforts
remain inadequate in terms of seriously diminishing
tobacco consumption in the country. The instability in
neighbouring countries such as Iraq and Syria has facili-
tated the ease with which contraband tobacco products
are traded. The unregistered trade also has a tendency
to increase because of excise tax increases on
cigarettes and the fight against the contraband
cigarette trade. Control over the tobacco market
should therefore be reinforced via strengthened in-
spection mechanisms and a more efficient fight
against contraband trade.
The study had some limitations. Data constraints
made it difficult to analyse industry strategies in the
case of Turkey at a finer level. In contrast to ad-
vanced economies, tobacco manufacturers in Turkey
do not have to publicize their financial data, as they
are not publicly open companies. Obtaining appropri-
ate price data was the main limitation in analysing
industry strategies. Monthly price data for a broader
range of cigarette brands from TAPDK and TurkStat
was unavailable. The analysis of pricing strategy,
therefore, had to be restricted to the average annual
prices of only seven cigarette brands for the period
2005–2012. This made it impossible to examine the
changes in before-tax prices in the months that sales
taxes were increased. It is recommended that TAPDK
make brand-specific price data on a monthly basis
available to researchers so that tobacco prices can be
more closely monitored.
Conclusion
In the face of the powerful global oligopolies in the
world tobacco market, policy suggestions need to be
developed on the basis of shared experiences and im-
plemented on an international scale. To this end, this
paper has provided findings from the Turkish case. It
is essential to insist on the following truth concerning
the dominant paradigm in tobacco control: the profit-
oriented tobacco industry is the main responsible
party for the diseases and deaths caused by its prod-
ucts, in Turkey as in the rest of the world. In this
sense fighting against the tobacco epidemic by hold-
ing the tobacco-addicted persons as the main respon-
sible actors for reduction in tobacco consumption will
be inadequate. To end the epidemic, supply-side
policies pointing to the tobacco industry as chiefly re-
sponsible also need to be implemented. Such policies
are largely excluded from the realm of tobacco con-
trol by reason of their lack of efficacy [54]. In reality,
supply-side interventions are disregarded as they
would eliminate a significant source of profit and tax
revenues. In order to improve the efficacy of anti-
tobacco strategies the WHO needs to put supply-side
policy measures on its agenda, take steps in this
direction and include these in the FCTC. Those
countries that have already put some supply-side
measures on their agendas should be protected from
interference from the tobacco industry via the WTO
[55]. Tobacco and tobacco products should be ex-
cluded from international trade agreements and their
trade should be prevented. In the long run, tobacco
manufacturing and trading companies should be
transformed into non-profit institutions or organiza-
tions with the termination of tobacco consumption
viewed as an attainable goal.
Fig. 12 Cigar and cigarillo sales in Turkey (million units), 2000–2015. Data source: [10]
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Endnotes
1Cigarette consumption increased from 10 billion to
2.2 trillion sticks between 1880 and 1960, and reached
5.7 trillion sticks in 2000 concurrent with the process of
trade and investment liberalization [5].
2MPOWER consists selected demand-side measures of
the FCTC: monitor tobacco use and prevention policies;
protect people from tobacco smoke; offer help to quit
tobacco use; warn about the dangers of tobacco; enforce
bans on tobacco advertising, promotion and sponsor-
ship; and raise taxes on tobacco.
3Through the changes in packaging and with cigarettes
[34, 52, 56–61], product innovation maintains an inter-
national brand’s image and persuades poorer smokers
not to downgrade to cheaper brands, give up smoking or
switch to illicit trade [62]. Also, as alternatives to
cigarettes, smokeless tobacco (chewing tobacco and
snuff ) and electronic cigarettes allow users to evade the
indoor smoking ban [63–65]; and they can delay quitting
smoking [66].
4The tobacco industry escapes the advertising, promo-
tion and sponsorship ban by developing unconventional
new methods [58, 67]. The industry uses brand stretch-
ing; brand sharing; product placement; promotion and
distribution of sample products; promotions and sales
via electronic mail, the Internet and text messages; and
sponsoring sport, music, fashion and art activities [24].
CSR campaigns are organized to restore corporate image
and get involved in policymaking processes [25, 52].
5TTCs use foreign investment to gain a share in new
markets [52]. The acquisition of privatized local tobacco
companies by the TTCs leads to aggressive marketing,
effective distribution and lower prices, all of which
increase the demand for cigarettes [51, 68–70]. They
also sustain profitability via continuous cost manage-
ment [9, 51, 52].
6The high market concentration in the global tobacco
sector [71] ensures pricing power for a small number of
TTCs [72, 73]. The effectiveness of sales taxes in terms
of reducing tobacco consumption depends, in part, on
pricing strategy [71]. Higher sales taxes generally make
tobacco products more expensive, but the level of price
increase depends on the decisions by manufacturers re-
garding how much of the tax will be passed on to con-
sumers [74]. Tobacco manufacturers may increase retail
cigarette prices over and above sales tax increases, lead-
ing to an overshifting of taxes; or they may decrease
retail prices, causing an undershifting of taxes. Limited
empirical evidence shows mixed results: tobacco manu-
facturers have preferred to apply one of the two
strategies in various national markets at different times
according to the price segments of their brands, industry
structure, tax structure etc. [53, 74]. In general, TTCs
use low prices in emerging markets to reach as many
consumers as they can [24] while they offer products at
various price segments in established markets [59] to
reach customers with different income levels [34].
7Illicit trade is an important strategy among TTCs’ mar-
ket entry tactics [52, 75–77]. It is used to launch their
products in nearby economies, to circumvent sales tax in-
creases, and to maintain access of the youth and low-
income consumers with cheap tobacco products [52].
8Lobbying serves to obtain market access, to block or
delay implementation of tobacco-control policies and
to manipulate individual policymakers and political
parties to influence tobacco control policy making
agendas [24, 48, 67, 78, 79].
9The industry also uses deceptive and/or manipulative
interference in scientific research: it manipulates the re-
sults of studies which prove that tobacco products cause
cancer, that second hand smoke is harmful, and that
nicotine is an addictive ingredient, by financing studies
that claim the opposite [24, 57, 78, 80, 81].
10The supply-side proposals in the literature have a
range of foci: they target product specifications, the
marketing-sales end, manufacturing conditions, or both
manufacturing and trade of tobacco products. The
following are some examples of supply-side policies: re-
ducing nicotine content in cigarettes, controlling to-
bacco marketing through a public agency, imposing
progressive limits on the amount of commercial tobacco
released for legal sale, controlling before-tax prices, and
transferring responsibility for the supply of cigarettes to
a sole supplier and distributor of tobacco products not
driven by profit [4, 25, 72, 82–91].
11For a review of the entries of foreign tobacco
companies into the Turkish market and accompanying
tobacco control measures see [14].
12Although tar levels – and what is considered high,
medium and low tar - vary across countries, for the sake
of consistency when making comparisons, the following
definitions are applied to Euromonitor data: high tar
cigarettes = tar content of greater than 10 mg; mid tar cig-
arettes = tar content of 6–10 mg, low tar cigarettes = tar
content of 4–6 mg; ultra low tar cigarettes = tar content
of less than 4 mg [10].
13Firstly, nominal prices (Additional file 3) were multi-
plied by the sales quantities of the cigarette brands
(Additional file 4) to find out nominal sales revenues for
each brand (Additional file 5). Next, nominal sales reve-
nues and sales quantities of the brands by price
segments were aggregated (Additional file 6 and
Additional file 7 respectively). Then, nominal weighted
prices (Additional file 8) were calculated by dividing
nominal sales revenues to sales quantities of cigarette
brands for each price segment. Finally, real weighted
prices (Additional file 9) were determined using the
Turkey’s CPI (2003 = 100) for Turkey.
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14Before-tax (net) nominal weighted prices (Add-
itional file 10) are calculated by deducting the tax
amount from nominal weighted prices (Additional file 8)
using the formula below. Then, before-tax (net) nominal
weighted prices are calculated in real terms by using Tur-
key’s CPI (2003 = 100) index and net real weighted prices
(Additional file 11) are found out.Before-tax (net) nominal
weighted price = N - [(N × SCT) + (N × VAT) + (S)]N:
Nominal weighted pricesS: Amount of specific tax (if any)
for relevant yearSCT: Special consumption taxVAT: Value
added tax
15The Tobacco Fund was removed from the import of
‘homogenized tobacco or reconstituted tobacco’, ‘ex-
panded tobacco’, ‘expanded stem’ and any kind of to-
bacco. The Fund was reduced for imported leaf tobacco.
16Indeed, in the 2010s, the diminished border security
because of the ongoing war in Syria and higher con-
sumption prevalence of around 2 million immigrants
than the average of Turkey contributed to the increase
in both official and contraband trading of tobacco and
tobacco products [21]. However, due to recently
strengthened border controls, the fight against smug-
gling of tobacco products has intensified and significant
smuggling have been curtailed [45]. This partially shifted
consumption from contraband to registered tobacco
products. Henceforth, the rise in official cigarette sales
between 2013 and 2016 from 91.6 to 105.5 billion sticks
was noteworthy. In the rising official sales, the loose im-
plementation of tobacco control measures, insufficient
inspection has especially played a role.
17The ratio of excise taxes in resale prices has risen
dramatically: for example, for a cigarette package sold at
8 TL, it was 40.88% in 2009, 48.38% in 2010, 80.25% in
2011, 81.66% in 2013 and 82.84% in 2015 [21].
18For example, when one adds to the official sales
(94.7 billion sticks), the consumption of contraband
cigarettes (around 14% of the official sales - 14 billion
sticks), brought total cigarette consumption 108.7 billion
sticks for 2014.
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